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CONSTITUTIONAL SHAPESHIFTING:
GIVING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
SUBSTANCE IN THE TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN
WORLD OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
Gerald S. Reameyt
For the first hundred years of the Fourth Amendment's life, gains in the
technology of surveillance were modest. With the advent of miniaturizationand
ever-increasing sophistication and capability of surveillance and detection
devices, the Supreme Court has struggled to adapt its understandingof "search"
to the constantly evolving devices and methods that challenge contemporary
understandingof privacy. In response to surveillance innovations, the Court has
taken varying positions, focusing first on property-based intrusions by
government, then shifting to privacy expectations, and, more recently,
resurrectingthe view that a trespassto propertycan define search.
This article surveys this constitutionalodyssey, noting the inadequacies of
each phase's approach. It then suggests a reconceptualizationof search doctrine
better designed to align constitutional protection with the moving target of
investigative techniques. The view of privacy, centralto the Fourth Amendment,
is recast as a broader, and more representative, normative component rather
than a simple risk-assessment. Investigative motive or intent, which only
intermittently has played a part in the definition of search, is proposed as a
constantfactor within search analysis. And trespass doctrine, only recently back
from the dead, is broadened and refocused to emphasize invasiveness more
generally. With candid recognition of the weaknesses and difficulties inherent in
all of these modes of analysis, the article makes the case for taking up the hard

t Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. I am grateful to the West
Virginia Law Review for inviting me to participate in its 2017 symposium, Evolving
Investigative Technologies and the Law. My preparation to speak, listen, and discuss this
important topic prompted me to reconsider ways in which law can best adapt to a rapidlychanging investigative landscape without doing violence to the principles of the Fourth
Amendment. This Article reflects my thinking on some relevant aspects of constitutional
law and what it means to conduct a "search." I was aided in the preparation of this Article
by my research assistants, Alexandra Zepeda and Raymond Saldana, and by my assistant,
Ms. Aurora Torres. I also owe a debt of gratitude to generations of law students who have
helped me perceive the fault lines in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence merely by voicing
their discontent with the results and reasoning of bedrock opinions in which the Supreme
Court has shaped, and sometimes shapeshifted, the law of search and seizure.
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job of conforming the language, tradition, and popular expectations of
constitutional protection to the realities of an ever-changing surveillance
landscape.
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INTRODUCTION
Dante Carlo Ciraolo had erected two privacy fences around his yard, a sixfoot high outer fence and a ten-foot high inner fence, to shield his marijuana
plants from the view of persons who might wander by his residence.' He failed,
however, to protect against aerial surveillance, perhaps because the possibility
that someone who happened to be flying overhead in an airplane would look
down into his yard, identify growing marijuana plants, and report the discovery
to the police, seemed too remote.2 His expectation may have been realized had

1. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
2. Id. Ciraolo's property lay in a sparsely inhabited area that was densely wooded
except for a few small clearings. It seems unlikely that someone flying in the vicinity would
happen to see the plants or be able to identify them from the altitude of navigable airspace.

2018]

CONSTITUTIONAL SHAPESHIFTING

203

it not been for an anonymous informant who telephoned the Santa Clara,
California, Police Department and reported that Ciraolo was growing marijuana
in his backyard.
Two officers from the agency were dispatched to investigate without
requesting consent to enter the yard or by securing a search warrant for the
premises, but by flying over the property in a private airplane at an altitude of
about 1,000 feet.' Peering down from that height, the officers, who were trained
in marijuana recognition, saw the plants growing in a plot within the yard. 6
In a decision that has confounded and frustrated generations of law
students since its publication in 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States
in California v. Ciraolo7 considered what it means for the government to
"search" the property of a citizen.8 This core question for Fourth Amendment
inquiry is rooted in the amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
"searches" and "seizures." 9 Unless the government engages in a "search"which the constitutional text does not definelo-the Fourth Amendment does
not apply. For defendants like Mr. Ciraolo, if there is no "search," there can be
no Fourth Amendment violation that would lead to the suppression of
incriminating evidence."
At first blush, readers of the Court's opinion may not understand why there
is any question about whether the Santa Clara officers were conducting a
search. It seems so clear, in the common understanding of what "search"
means, that they were "searching" for marijuana plants on the Ciraolo property
Californiav. Ciraolo, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1513 (last visited May 3,

2018).
3. See Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 209.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. Id. The officers photographed the plants using a standard 35mm film camera. Id.
7. Id. at 207.
8. See Id. at 217-18 (Powell, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable "searches," which are determined by intrusion on an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy).
9. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, ALAN C. MICHAELS & RIC SIMMONS, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION § 6.01[A] (7th ed. 2017).
10. The Fourth Amendment contains the only reference in the United States
Constitution to the word "search," a reference that is not elaborated on or explained in the
amendment's single sentence. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In its entirety, the Fourth
Amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. See DRESSLER ET AL., supra, note 9, at 65 ("[I]f a court determines that no search
(and no seizure) has occurred, Fourth Amendment analysis immediately ceases.").
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and that they were doing so very deliberately, and probably at some expense to
their agency. The Court was limited, however, in its legal application of the
word "search" by its prior groundbreaking opinion in Katz v. United States. 3
In Katz, the Court rejected its previous reliance on physical trespass 1 4 to
determine whether the government is searching, and established an analytical
construct focused instead on whether the defendant's expectation of privacy has
been violated by governmental action.
Writing for the majority, Justice
Stewart famously explained that "the Fourth Amendment protects people-and
not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures," and that "the
reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion into any given enclosure."" However laudatory this
conceptual shift may be, "expectation analysis" fails to clearly delineate which
expectations are reasonable, and which are not. By eschewing the use of
trespass as the touchstone of a "search," and substituting expectation of privacy
in its place, the Court took upon itself the burden of case-by-case
determinations of whether a person raising a claim of unlawful search had both
a subjective and objective expectation of privacy at the time of the intrusion.
Had the officers in Ciraolo trespassed onto the suspect's property, the case
might have been simpler for the majority, given that it would have been easier
to conclude that Mr. Ciraolo's expectation of privacy was reasonable.
12. Assuming that the Santa Clara Police Department did not own an airplane when
this surveillance occurred, the agency would have been required to charter a piloted aircraft
for this purpose. Even if the Department used its own plane, its expenses would have
included a pro-rata share of the purchase price and maintenance for the aircraft, as well as
fuel for the flight, storage fees for the aircraft, possible landing fees, and the not
inconsiderable cost of a pilot, along with the salaries of the officers engaged in the
surveillance. According to a National Institute of Justice study, "fixed-wing light aircraft
generally cost between $60,000 and $130,000 to purchase and $50 per hour to fuel and
maintain." See THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, https://www.nij.gov/topics/lawenforcement/operations/aviation/
pages/types-of-aircraft.aspx#fixed-wing
(last visited
Apr. 7, 2018).
13. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. Prior to Katz, trespass was required in order for the government's conduct to
constitute a search. See Russell L. Weaver, The Fourth Amendment and Technologically
Based Surveillance, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 231, 234-35 (2015) ("[A]bsent a trespassory
intrusion ... the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable.").
15. See 389 U.S. at 353. The Court seemed to abandon the trespass doctrine completely
in analyzing whether a search had occurred: "We conclude that the underpinnings of
Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass'
doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling." Id.; see also Tracey
Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the TwentyFirst Century, 72 Miss. L.J. 51, 61 (2002) (noting that Katz rejected physical intrusion or
trespass as a prerequisite for Fourth Amendment protection).
16. See 389 U.S. at 353.
17. Id.
18. By the time the Court considered Ciraolo, the trespass doctrine had been
abandoned as a means to determine whether the government's action was a "search."
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However, there was no physical trespass, and the Court was left trying to
9
determine whether a "visual trespass" into the home's "curtilage"' might have
In this
violated Mr. Ciraolo's reasonable expectation of privacy.
determination, the Court grappled with the terrible difficulties that expectation
analysis presents. It was no longer possible after Katz to rely on trespass alone
in deciding whether a "search" had occurred, and the Court found itself trying
to sort out whether Ciraolo had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and,
if so, whether that expectation was objectively reasonable, a much more
difficult question than whether a physical intrusion had occurred.
Ciraolo's erection of double privacy fencing was clearly intended to keep
2
prying eyes out of the backyard and away from the marijuana crop. ' That
22
much the Court accepted, at least with respect to "normal sidewalk traffic."
But not all visual access to the property was blocked, and as the Court pointed
out, "[n]or does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict
some views of his activities preclude an officer's observations from a public
vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly
visible."23

The Court seemed to conclude that because the officers were flying in

However, had the case involved a physical trespass, it would have been a shorter logical step
to the conclusion that any expectation of privacy he claimed was reasonable. Compare
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n. 3 (2012) (holding that where the government
obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, a search has
"undoubtedly occurred") with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (stating that reasonable expectation of privacy analysis is a "twofold
requirement" requiring both a subjective expectation of privacy and that the expectation be'
one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable).
19. The State accepted that Ciraolo's backyard was within the "curtilage" of the home,
the area intimately associated with the domestic activities of the residence. See Ciraolo, 476
U.S. at 212-13. Although the Court in Katz rejected the notion of constitutionally protected
"areas" as defining Fourth Amendment protection, Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, the curtilage of a
"house" is generally considered to be within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See
DRESSLER ET AL., supra, note 9, at § 5.03 (concluding that "house" constitutionally includes
the curtilage).
20. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[R]espondent's expectation
of privacy in the curtilage of his home, although reasonable as to intrusions on the ground,
was unreasonable as to surveillance from the navigable airspace.").
21. See id. at 211 ("Clearly-and understandably-respondent has met the test of
manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful
agricultural pursuits.").
22. See id. Chief Justice Burger, author of the majority opinion in Ciraolo, observed
that it was "not entirely clear" whether a citizen or policeman "perched on the top of a truck
or a two-level bus" and looking into the yard despite the fencing would defeat Ciraolo's
subjective expectation of privacy. See id. at 211-212. But in deciding the case, it hardly
seemed to matter because Ciraolo presumably would not have had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy, whatever level of privacy he may have thought his fencing would
afford.
23. Id. at 213.
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"public navigable airspace,"2 4 their observations of the activity within Mr.
Ciraolo's yard were no more intrusive and no more a Fourth Amendment
"search" than if the officers had walked past the yard and Ciraolo had only the
visual protection of a chain-link fence.25 The frustration experienced by many
law students reading Chief Justice Burger's opinion on this point often stems
from the obvious investigative intent the officers demonstrated. The Court
decided that the deliberate effort to identify marijuana was "irrelevant" in
deciding whether a search had occurred,2 6 despite Ciraolo's considerable
measures to maintain a private backyard. After all, the Court explained, any
member of the public flying over the property could have "glanced" down and
seen what the officers saw. 27 This explanation rings hollow with many who
encounter this opinion for the first time. Would a passenger on a commercial
flight, or one flying in a private aircraft for recreation, really be able to identify
individual plants at a "glance" from an altitude of 1,000 feet? 28
While the Ciraolo Court added to our understanding of what constitutes a
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, the case did not involve any hightechnology surveillance techniques. Rather, the novelty derives from the use of
an airplane as a platform for observation, because aircraft technology already
had been in use for nearly eighty years. 2 9 Moreover, fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft, jets and propeller-driven planes, were widely used for commercial,
scientific, and recreational purposes. 30 Today, an unmanned aircraft-a
drone-might be used to do the same job.3 ' Based on the Court's holding in

24. See id.

25. See id. at 213-14 (holding that measures taken to restrict some views of a person's
activities do not preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he has
a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible).
26. See id. at 213.
27. See id. at 213-14.

28. The Court cited no empirical evidence that such sightings occur frequently, or even
occasionally, much less that sightings are reported by the public for police investigation. See
id.
29. The first flight of the Wright brothers took place on December 17, 1903. See 1903
- The First Flight, WRIGHT BRos. NAT'L MEM'L, https://www.nps.gov/wrbr/learn/
historyculture/thefirstflight.htm (last updated Apr. 14, 2015). The use of aircraft for
observation dates from at least WWI. See The War in the Air - Observation and

Reconnaissance, http://www.firstworldwar.com/airwar/observation.htm (last visited Apr. 7,
2018).
30. The number of active pilots in the United States reached its peak in the 1980s at
more than 827,000 before beginning to decline. See New Report Shows Decline in General
Aviation, COMPOSITES WORLD (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.compositesworld.com/news/newreport-shows-decline-in-general-aviation;
THE BIRTH OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION,

http://www.birthofaviation.org/birth-of-commercial-aviation (last visited Apr. 7, 2018); How
many planes are there in the world right now?, THE TELEGRAPH,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
travel/travel-truths/how-many-planes-are-there-in-the-world
(last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
31. See Surveillance Drones, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/
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Ciraolo, that too would presumably not be a search. The use of more
sophisticated devices to conduct criminal investigation thus raises interesting,
and difficult, questions about the application of the Fourth Amendment to these
new "searches."
The surveillance "technology" used by the police in Ciraolo presented the
Court with a glimpse into a future of constitutional decision making in which
the landscape of Fourth Amendment doctrine would constantly shift as
investigative methods became increasingly sophisticated. When Katz was
decided in 1967, the trespass doctrine had proven itself inadequate as an
analytical method to deal with electronic eavesdropping and other forms of
surveillance made possible by advances in technology. The successor to
trespass, reasonable expectation of privacy, offered increased capacity to deal
with these changes by focusing on the view of the person being surveilled
rather than on whether the government physically invaded an area in which the
person had a property interest. But by 2001, the Court was confronted with a
search by a thermal imaging device, a piece of technology that permitted law
enforcement to "see" behind brick walls without physically intruding.32 Sensing
that its expectation analysis would prove insufficient to cope with surveillance
devices that are now in "general public use" 33 the Court continued to rely on its
holding in Katz until 2012 when, perhaps in frustration, it revived the trespass
doctrine to operate alongside expectation of privacy. 34 The patchwork nature of
the Court's approach to the "search" question demonstrates a need to think
more broadly about the fundamental questions of the Fourth Amendment, and
to reformulate the approach that now serves us poorly. After reviewing the
winding path that has led the Court to its current view, I will suggest an
architecture for a Fourth Amendment understanding that will better withstand
the inevitable onslaught of rapid technological change. I argue not for brightline rules, but for a more normative understanding of expectation of privacy
coupled with a recognition that the investigative intent or motive of law
enforcement matters. An objective evaluation of invasiveness without the
current use of trespass doctrine will allow courts to more neatly conform the
protections of the Fourth Amendment with the expectations of the people it is
meant to protect.
I. LAW CHASING TECHNOLOGY

The Supreme Court has struggled to find a single, overarching mode of
analysis that faithfully accounts for the 18th Century language and concepts of

surveillance-drones (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
32. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
33. See id. at 34.
34. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012).
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the Fourth Amendment while recognizing the ever-changing investigative
techniques of the 21st Century.
In order to appreciate the increasing gap
between how the Framers conceived of a governmental "search" and what that
term encompasses today, it is instructive to consider just a few of the ways in
which investigation by law enforcement has changed.36
A. A New Perspective-"Perspective Enhancing" Surveillance
The Ciraolo case serves as a useful example of a technology (flight) that is
used in aid of criminal investigation. Unlike other technological devices that
enhance the senses, the airplane in Ciraolo was used to enhance the officers'
perspective, permitting them to see what they could not have seen otherwise.
A ladder, or Chief Justice Burger's two-story bus, would have accomplished
the same thing, as would the modern drone. Thanks to miniaturization, the
enabling advance that makes virtually all of modern surveillance equipment
possible and effective, high-definition cameras attached to small drones provide
law enforcement officers an easily accessible enhanced perspective-a
perspective that previously was costly or clumsy.4 0 Unlike the aircraft used for
a single purpose in Ciraolo, miniature unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) may
soon be available to every officer. 4 1 Amazon has acquired a patent for just such
a device that could be carried by patrol officers and deployed during an

35. See Maclin, supra, note 15, at 51-52 (arguing that the increasing use of technology
presented Fourth Amendment questions not imagined by the Framers); Weaver, supra, note
14, at 233 (stating that the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has not kept
pace with advances in technology).
36. Of course, it is also important to bear in mind that there were no organized police
forces as we know them when the Fourth Amendment was ratified. Searches by agents of the
government certainly occurred, and it is reasonable to believe that the abuses of these agents
were the chief harm against which the Fourth Amendment was directed. See Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-83 (1965). Modern law enforcement officers of all stripes are at
least roughly analogous to the government agents at the time of the framing, notwithstanding
the vast differences in organization, purpose, training, and methods that exist. See Olivia B.
Waxman, How the U.S. Got Its Police Force, TIME, (May 18, 2017), http://time.com/
4779112/police-history-origins/.
37. For an overview and critique of sense-enhanced searches, see generally David E.
Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth Amendment, 16 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 465 (2007).

38. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (finding that a 10-ft fence shielded yard from normal
sidewalk traffic but not from someone perched on "the top of a truck or a two-level bus").
39. See id.

40. See Surveillance Drones, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/
issues/surveillance-drones (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
41. See Bambi Majumdar, Flying body cameras: The next wave of police technology,

(Nov. 9, 2016), http://exclusive.multibriefs.com/content/flying-body-camerasthe-next-wave-of-police-technology/law-enforcement-defense-security.
MULTIBRIEF,
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42
encounter to give the officer a view from a different perspective. While
obviously useful to police officers, this "enhanced perspective" seems
potentially far more invasive than the relatively primitive expedient of climbing
ladders or chartering an aircraft.

1. Pervasive Surveillance
Developing surveillance technology is pervasive and enveloping, rather
than directed toward an individual. ShotSpotter, a gunshot detection system,
uses a combination of audio and other sensors positioned throughout a city or
neighborhood to detect gunshots, fix their location of origin, and alert law
enforcement. While the developers of the system deny that it is used to
monitor conversations or sounds other than the distinctive report of a firearm
being discharged,44 would the incidental capture of incriminating conversation
intended to be private be considered a "search" as it was in the Katz case, or
would this be another example of enhanced perspective, as in Ciraolo?
Pervasive surveillance also can be visual, and not only by satellite.
observation. Images transmitted from high-definition cameras mounted on
fixed-wing aircraft, and potentially on helicopters or drones, provide law
enforcement with pictures of the movement of all persons and vehicles over a
45
very large area-an area the size of a city-for an extended period of time.
Undoubtedly helpful in tracking persons fleeing the scene of a crime, or in
providing protective surveillance of an event or site, or even in solving crimes
after the fact, this technology allows aerial observation of not just a single piece
of property, as in Ciraolo, but hundreds of residences and buildings, as well as
people and vehicles, simultaneously.4 6 Nonexistent in 1986 when Ciraolo was
decided, this new surveillance technology may trigger privacy concerns by the
Supreme Court that were not fully considered thirty years ago.
Justices Sotomayor and Alito, concurring in United States v. Jones, a
GPS tracking case, expressed such concern over a non-trespassory, long-term
surveillance of the movements of a suspect's vehicle.48 Unlike the Jones
42. See id.
43. See Hannah Gold, ShotSpotter: Gunshot Detection System Raises Privacy
Concerns on Campuses, THE GUARDIAN, (July 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/law/
2015/jul/17/shotspotter-gunshot-detection-schools-campuses-privacy.
44. See id.
45. See Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Everyone in an Area
for Several Hours at a Time, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 5, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/new-surveillance-technology-cantrack-everyone-in-an-area-for-several-hours-at-a-time/2014/02/05/82f 1556e-876f- 11 e3a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html?utm term=.3dd741040b8c.
46. See id.
47. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 401 (2012).
48. See id. at 415-16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 430-31 (Alito, J., concurring).
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majority, Sotomayor and Alito, joined by Justices Kagan, Breyer, and
Ginsburg, accepted that such surveillance constitutes a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.4 9 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
did not reject the possibility that a prolonged surveillance not involving
trespass would come within the reach of Fourth Amendment protection.5 0 In
considering whether placing the GPS tracking device on Jones's car and
tracking it for an extended period constituted a search, Justice Scalia observed,
"[i]t may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without
an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the
present case does not require us to answer that question.
As technological advances allow surveillance to become easier, cheaper,
more reliable, and more thorough,52 the simple analysis of older cases like
United States v. Knotts,53 a "beeper" tracking case, will become increasingly
inadequate to address the threshold question of what is a "search." While
Knotts held that traditional "tailing" and observing from a public vantage point
may not have impinged on a suspect's reasonable expectation of privacy, the
kind of pervasive, continuous, long-term surveillance that is now readily
available to law enforcement presents wholly different, and far greater, privacy
issues.
2. The "Third-Party" Doctrine
Like visual observation, eavesdropping is an ancient surveillance technique
that has been expanded and enhanced by technology. In the days prior to the
surveillance revolution, including the time of the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, surreptitiously listening to a neighbor's conversation was
employed as an information-gathering technique.5 4 This method, which surely
must have been used since the earliest development of speech in humans, was
well known to the authors of our constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search. 5 That guarantee was limited, then as now, by the doctrine that what is

49. See id. at 414-31.
50. See id. at 412.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 414-16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (writing that large amounts of

intimate information are available to government at "relatively low cost" by GPS
monitoring).
53. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
54. See JOHN L. LOCKE, EAVESDROPPING: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 19 (2010) ("The urge

to eavesdrop is a natural disposition, one that evolved anciently, develops early, is expressed
universally, confers a number of important benefits, and has a long history, dating back to
the Middle Ages."); Dave Wilton, Eavesdrop, (June 11, 2006), http://www.wordorigins.org/
index.php/eavesdrop (discussing the medieval origins of the word "eavesdrop").
55. See LOCKE, supra, note 54, at 33 (writing that ancient Roman comedies of Plautus
and Terence portray at least ten bouts of eavesdropping per play and that "[t]hese comedies
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knowingly and voluntarily exposed to the sight or hearing of a third person
cannot be considered "private."5 6 This notion that a privacy expectation is per
se unreasonable if speech, conduct, or other forms of incriminating evidence
are willingly exposed, may have been suited to an age in which it was relatively
easy for every person to gauge the likelihood that others would overhear or
observe, but those days have passed.5 ' As Justice Sotomayor acknowledged in
her concurring opinion in Jones,
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks.
When the Supreme Court in Katz adopted "reasonable expectation of
privacy" to replace trespass analysis to hold that surreptitious eavesdropping by
the government was a search, it acknowledged the simplistic notion of trespass
was an unsatisfactory way to deal with more modem surveillance methods.9
While the expanded definition of "search" enhanced the Court's ability to deal
with more than physical intrusion, it presented its own challenges from its
adoption. o

The placing of an electronic "bug" or eavesdropping device on the outside
of a telephone booth in order to hear one side of a conversation seems by
today's standards, a method from a hundred years ago, although it actually was
deployed in the mid-1960s against Mr. Katz.6 1 Indeed, the telephone booth to

make it clear that eavesdropping was 'in' over two thousand years ago, and it has surely
stayed in."). Locke cites an example of eavesdropping in literature that slightly predates
American independence and the adoption of the language of the Fourth Amendment. See id.
(citing a French novel by Marivaux published in about 1714 in which a young man
eavesdrops on a conversation between his lover and a rival on multiple occasions).
56. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Paul Ohm, The
Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 Miss. L.J. 1309, 1327-28 (2012) (writing
that "knowing exposure" has been used to take observations from airplanes and helicopters
outside the Fourth Amendment).
57. See id. at 1130 (noting that few legal scholars find anything kind to say about the
third-party doctrine).
58. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see Adam R. Pearlman & Erick
S. Lee, National Security, Narcissism, Voyeurism, and Kyllo: How Intelligence Programs
and Social Norms Are Affecting the Fourth Amendment, 2 TEx. A&M L. REV. 719, 743
(2015) (noting Justice Sotomayor's warning that persons providing private information to
third parties do not necessarily waive their desire for privacy).
59. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (holding that whether electronic listening and
recording of conversation is a search cannot turn on whether the device happened to
physically intrude into any given enclosure).
60. See DRESSLER ET AL., supra note 9.
61. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348 (stating that FBI agents attached an electronic listening
and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which Katz made his
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which the "bug" was attached is an item scarcely known to those born during
the age of the cell phone and smart phone. Sense-enhancing and perspectiveenhancing devices that were not imagined at the time of Katz now permit the
gathering of information from conversation, data storage, internet usage, text
messaging, location services, and so much more, all by accessing the miniature
computer/transceiver that has replaced telephones, letters, calendars, and file
cabinets. If all of these "effects" are to be protected by the Fourth Amendment,
the concept of a "search" must account for the many ways in which that
information may be acquired, as well as for shared beliefs about what is
"private."
3. When High-Tech Enters Sacred Spaces by Sense-Enhancement
Gathering information from cars being driven on public streets or
conversations occurring in public places presents relatively easy constitutional
questions, particularly if the means of surveillance allows collection of only
limited information about what has been exposed to public sight or hearing.
Collecting evidence from within areas previously considered to be
constitutionally protected,62 and especially from within the home, the most
sacred of those places,6 3 more clearly implicates the prohibition on
unreasonable searches of "houses" contained within the Fourth Amendment
and is therefore less constitutionally problematic. 64 When high-tech devices,
and sometimes even very low-tech devices, are used to learn what is occurring
behind the walls of a residence or commercial structure, the inclination of the
Supreme Court has been to label the use of the devices a search.
Justice Antonin Scalia became the Supreme Court's de facto designated
expert on what constitutes a search, particularly when that search involved the
home. He first addressed the implications of surveillance by technology in
Kyllo v. United States,66 a case in which the police used what seems now to be a
relatively crude thermal imaging device positioned on public property to
determine that an unusually high level of heat was originating in particular
parts of Danny Kyllo's residence.
That observation corroborated Agent
calls).
62. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (rejecting concept that particular places are
"constitutionally protected").
63. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (holding that "when it comes
to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals").
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; DRESSLER ET AL., supra note 9.
65. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that use of thermal
imager to detect "hot spots" within a home consistent with use of grow lights for marijuana
cultivation is a search); Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (holding that use of drug detection dog
within curtilage of residence to detect drugs within the home is a search).
66. 533 U.S. 27.
67. See id. at 29-30.
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William Elliott's belief that Kyllo was using grow lamps in his home to
cultivate marijuana plants.68
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the use of the device was a
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, even though the images were
obtained while the thermal imager was set up in a public space and the heat
emanations the unit measured were taken from the exterior surface of the
residence. 69 Unlike the surveillance activities in Ciraolo, Katz, and Jones, it
was not the perspective of the agent that was enhanced by using a piece of
equipment that would better position him to use his ordinary senses, but rather
a device that enhanced his senses, enabling Agent Elliott to sense something he
could not have sensed without invading the curtilage of Kyllo's home.
Technology allowed him to do that. In Ciraolo, and even in Katz and Jones,
agents could have obtained the same information by use of ordinary human
senses employed in a space to which the public had free access. Their
perspective was improved by technology, putting them in a better position to
hear or see, but their senses were not enhanced in the way that the thermal
imager allowed.
The question for the Kyllo majority then became whether this case would
be decided under the rubric of exposure of information to a third-party. Was
this information plucked "off-the-wall" from a public place entitled to
constitutional protection? Did using the thermal imager from the street
constitute a search? Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, viewed the case much like other "plain-view"
cases in which the officer was in a place where he was authorized to be when
70
he gathered information that was "knowingly expose[d] to the public." Based
on the Court's treatment in Ciraolo and other cases," the dissenters reasoned
that no "search" had occurred. Justice Scalia and the majority saw it differently,
though. Noting that the thermal imager's scan could potentially reveal
"intimate" details from within the home,72 the Court held that even the limited
7
information obtained by the thermal scan was the product of a "search."
Anticipating further advances in technology and the ways in which
surveillance would be conducted, Justice Scalia acknowledged what Kyllo
presaged:
68. See id.
69. See id. The imager, an Agema Thermovision 210, was located in the agent's
vehicle when the scans were made. One was taken from across the street from the front of
the house, and the second was from the street in the rear of the structure. See id.
70. See id. at 41-44 (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 42, n. 2.
72. See id. at 38. Justice Scalia rather famously observed that even a crude device like
the one used in the Kyllo case "might disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady
of the house takes her daily sauna and bath-a detail that many would consider 'intimate."'
See id.
73. See id. at 40.
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To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to
permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical "intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area," constitutes a search-at least where
(as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.7 4

Like other technologies that in the future would, and will, permit everexpanding amounts of information to be obtained from greater and greater
distances, the thermal imager allowed what might be termed a kind of "virtual
trespass" that could go undetected by those being watched. And although
Justice Scalia resurrected the "trespass doctrine" in Jones to decide that
affixing a GPS tracking device to a vehicle is a search, he clearly anticipated
that technology would outpace the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
standard unless a new analytical construct could be found to address the
rapidly-changing landscape of surveillance.
One of the technologies that Justice Scalia anticipated in Kyllo has now
been fully developed and deployed.7 6 That device, sold under the trade name
"Range-R",7 7 gives law enforcement personnel the ability to "see through walls
and other opaque barriers,"7 8 a technology that Justice Scalia predicted when
Kyllo was decided as "a clear, and scientifically feasible, goal of law
enforcement research and development." 7 9 Recognizing that the Court would be
required to apply the Fourth Amendment to techniques and equipment not yet
developed, and perhaps not yet imagined, Justice Scalia wrote, "[w]hile the
technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt
must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or
development."s 0 Kyllo was a relatively new and incomplete attempt to fashion
such a rule.
4. Trespassing to Use Old Technology
Years after its decision in Kyllo, the Supreme Court considered a very old
"technology" 81 to determine what was happening within a residence. In

74. See id. at 34 (citation omitted).
75. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 412-13 (stating that in some future case the Court may have
to solve the "vexing problems" of long-term surveillance that does not involve a trespass).
76. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36, n.3.
77. See RANGE-R, http://www.range-r.com (last visited Apr. 7,2018).
78. See id. Range-R doesn't actually permit the police to "see through walls" but it
does indicate from positioning on an outside wall whether anyone is in a room on the other
side of the wall and, if so, whether that person is moving about or is stationary. See id.
79. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36.
80. Id.
81. See Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1420 (Alito, J., dissenting) (due to their acute sense of
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Floridav. Jardines,82 Justice Scalia, again writing for the majority on the
question of what constitutes a "search," explained that the use of a drugdetection dog sniffing at the front door of a suspect's residence was a
83
some
While sm
"trespass" that warranted Fourth Amendment protection.
on
decided
been
have
could
also
the
case
members of the Court believed
home
whether use of the dog to detect drug odors emanating from within the
violated Jardines's expectation of privacy,84 Justice Scalia and the majority
preferred to keep "easy cases easy"8 5 by relying on the "property-rights
baseline'' 86 that had been recognized in Jones.
Interestingly, what made the officers' (and the dog's) actions a trespass
was that they exceeded the limits of the "implicit license" that exists for visitors
to a home to "approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait
briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave."
What defeated the implicit license the officers and their dog had to use the front
walkway, step onto the porch, and allow the, dog to sniff was the investigative
intent that prompted their actions. "There is no customary invitation to do that,"
according to Justice Scalia."
While Jardines involved "old" sense-enhancing technology rather than
some recent mechanical or digital advance in surveillance and detection, the
Court approached the search issue in much the same way it would have done
with a modem, sophisticated appliance. Reaffirming the revived trespass
rationale, however, added an alternative mode of analysis to the alreadydifficult determination of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy had been
violated by the actions of the police. Justice Scalia apparently believed the
"property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment" would make some
cases "easy" to decide, but what had been a one-step inquiry post-Katz and
prior to Jones has now become a two-step analysis. 89
II. THE EVOLUTION OF "SEARCH" DOCTRINE

A crude timeline of the development of surveillance technology on the one
hand, and constitutional doctrine on the other, is useful in conceptualizing not
only the progression of the science of technology, but also how the Court
responded to that progression. Such a timeline might look like this:
smell, dogs have been used in law enforcement for centuries).
82. Id.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
133 S.Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
id. at 1417.
id.
id. at 1415.
id. at 1416.
id. at 1417; Jones, 565 U.S. at 411.
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Technology induced shapeshifting
State of the art

State of the analysis

>1791-1967: Primitive technology
until latter-half of 19th Century
>1967-2012 (The Katz era):

>"Search" limited to physical

Technology develops rapidly,
becomes sophisticated with
miniaturization
>2012-present: Tech development
continues and expands in scope
and capability at hyper-speed

trespass (see Silverman - 1961)
>Physical trespass supplanted by
REOP, investigative motive
ignored, "general public use"
debuts in Kylla (2001)
>Physical trespass makes a return
in Jones and Jardines to take its
place alongside REOP

Until the decision in Katz in 1967, devices used for surveillance were oniy
modestly capable of sense-enhancement or perspective-enhancement. 0 The
Court experienced no difficulty in concluding, for example, that the use of a
flashlight or binoculars, did not transform surveillance or observation into a
"search" when it otherwise would not have been one. 9' Likewise, sniffs by dogs
trained to detect drugs, bombs, and all manner of contraband, ordinarily are not
considered to be searches,9 although it might be said that dogs enhance human
ability to smell by giving their handlers signs of detection when the dogs smell
93
something that humans cannot>.
While these uses of sense-enhancing
"technology" presented some difficult questions of their own, the devices and
methods were sufficiently common and available that privacy concerns seemed
less acute.
As the "electronic" age ushered in smaller and more sensitive surveillance
90. For a historical perspective on the development of surveillance technology, see
generally Toni Weller, The Information State: An HistoricalPerspective on Surveillance,
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIEs 57-63 (2012); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at
33-34 (stating that advances in technology have exposed places previously considered
private).
91. See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
92. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
93. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 15 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (dogs used as "senseenhancing" tool that is not "in general public use"); State v. Rendon, 477 S.W.3d 805, 813
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (Richardson, J., concurring) (use of drug-detection dog is use of
"sense-enhancing" device of the sort discussed in Kyllo).
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equipment, it became increasingly clear that the capability of this equipment
was outstripping the awareness of the general public.94 It may be that the rapid,
almost frantic, development of these devices was due to the "space race" in
which the United States was engaged, or that it was a by-product of the Cold
War and the maturation of electronic espionage, or perhaps that it was of the
result of other social and scientific advances. Whatever the reasons, the
evolution from the property-based analysis of Silverman v. United States" in
1961 to the expectation-of-privacy approach of Katz in 1967 soon proved
insufficient to deal satisfactorily with such rapid change.
One of the earliest of the Supreme Court's attempts to deal with
surveillance by sophisticated devices outside the reach, and sometimes outside
96
the ken, of the general populace was Dow Chemical Co. v. United States. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) engaged a commercial aerial
photographer to fly over a chemical plant operated by Dow Chemical because
the company would not agree to allow the agency to inspect its facility for a
second time to determine that it was complying with the Clean Air Act. The
issue in the suit brought by Dow against the EPA was whether the aerial
photographs obtained without a search warrant by flying over the plant were
the product of a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and if
so, whether that search was unreasonable.98 Californiav. Ciraolo, which was
decided the same day as Dow Chemical, settled the question of whether
99
surveillance from an aircraft flying in navigable airspace was a "search," but
the photographs taken in Dow Chemical were obtained by "using highly
sophisticated surveillance equipment" rather than by the naked eyes of officers
passing over a backyard.'oo The Court was forced to at least consider whether
94. See Torin Monahan, "War Rooms of the Street: Surveillance Practices in
TransportationControl Centers, THE COMMUNICATION REVIEW 10, 367 (2007) (stating that
rapid proliferation of digital technologies throughout everyday life afford surveillance
capabilities that resist critical investigation or public awareness).
95. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). In Silverman, the District of
Columbia police inserted a "spike mike" into the wall of the defendant's house, penetrating
the physical space of the residence in order to overhear conversations. See id. at 506. The
majority specifically rejected the suggestion that it should "consider the large questions" of
the Fourth Amendment that might be presented by "other frightening paraphernalia which
the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human society." See id. at 509.
Distinguishing cases in which no physical trespass occurred, the Court observed that "the
officers overheard the petitioners' conversations only by usurping part of the petitioners'
house or office." See id. at 510-11. It concluded that, "this Court has never held that a federal
officer may without a warrant and without consent physically entrench into a man's office or
home, there secretly observe or listen, and relate at the man's subsequent criminal trial what
was seen or heard." See id. at 511-12.
96. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
97. See id. at 229-30; 42 U.S.C. § 7414.
98. See476U.S.at229-31.
99. See id. at 234-35.
100. See id. at 239.
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enhanced surveillance methods might distinguish the claims of Dow Chemical
from those of Dante Carlo Ciraolo.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Dow Chemical, opined that,
"[i]t may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of private
property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally
available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally
proscribed absent a warrant."'o' In making this observation, the Chief Justice
debuted a distinction based on the sophistication of the equipment used and its
availability for general public use.
The Dow Chemical Court was careful to draw a line between simple senseenhancing devices and the more "sophisticated" ones that might raise
constitutional issues: "The mere fact that human vision is enhanced
somewhat . . . does not give rise to constitutional problems. An electronic
device to penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record confidential
discussions of chemical formulae or other trade secrets would raise very
different and far more serious questions . . . . "102
Seemingly, even the sophisticated aerial camera used in Dow Chemical to
take photographs "not so revealing of intimate details" was insufficient to
elevate the government's conduct to the level of a "search," but the Court
imagined a case and technology in which the result would be different.' 03 In
adopting this formulation, it is impossible to determine whether employing a
technology more "sophisticated" than a professional aerial camera would
suffice to require constitutional protection, or instead, whether the Court found
that the conduct fell short of a search because, while the camera was
sufficiently advanced, it was not used to produce "intimate details."'0 4
A. A Distinction Based on Sophistication and Availability
Justice Scalia's characterization of the Agema Thermovision 210 that
scanned Danny Kyllo's home for heat emanations placed the device clearly on
the side of those "not in general use."'0 o To highlight the majority's reliance on
the "general use" concept, Justice Scalia concluded his analysis in Kyllo by
holding that, "[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in
generalpublic use, to explore details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a "search" and

101. Id.at238.
102. Id. at 239.
103. See id. at 238-39 (opining that highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not
generally available to the public, like an electronic device to penetrate walls or windows,
would raise "very different and far more serious questions" than the cameras used in Dow).
104. See id.
105. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
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is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."' 06 For Justice Scalia, and
surely for his colleagues in the Kyllo majority, the fashioning of a "new rule" 0 7
must have been a difficult attempt to grapple with the rapidly-expanding
problems posed by the explosive growth of technology. 08
But if the Kyllo majority struggled with the way to define "searches" by
new surveillance devices, their colleagues on the Court remained convinced
that existing rules were adequate for the purpose.'0 9 Justices Stevens,
Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy took exception to the majority's effort to
take 'the long view" and decide this case based largely on the potential of yet"through-the-wall
allow
might
that
technology
to-be-developed
surveillance."10

The dissenters criticized the majority's bright-line rule by pointing out that
"general use" is something of a moving target,"' and as soon as a device passes
into general use, the public loses whatever constitutional protection was
afforded against surveillance by that device." 2 Perhaps even more obviously, it
is entirely unclear what constitutes "general use," or whether the thermal
13
imager in Kyllo qualified for treatment as an exotic piece of equipment. By
the time the case was decided by the Supreme Court, it almost certainly was not
exotic or generally unavailable." 4
In adopting the "general use" criterion, Justice Scalia placed himself in the
uncomfortable position of advocating what might be considered, as Justice
Stevens characterized it, a "newly minted rule."" NBC News Justice
Correspondent Pete Williams got to the nub of this irony in his 2012 interview
with Justice Scalia:
Williams: You have a Fourth Amendment that protects against
106. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
107. See id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Kyllo majority's reliance
on general use as a "new rule").
108. See Pearlman & Lee, supra, note 58, at 738 (arguing that the Supreme Court
attempted in Kyllo to provide generalizable standards and guidelines for technology that is
constantly pushing boundaries).
109. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 42.
111. See id. at 47.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 47 n.5. Thousands of the thermal imagers used in Kyllo were in
circulation at the time the case was argued, as were thousands of competing units. See
History of Thermal Imaging SECURITIES SALES & INTEGRATION (Dec. 31, 2012)
https://www.securitysales.com/ surveillance/history-of-thermal-imaging/2/Some years ago,
in preparing to teach this opinion, I discovered that an Agema Thermovision 210 just like the
one used in Kyllo was sold on the eBay online auction site for a couple of hundred dollars.
Even at the time of the opinion, these units could be purchased or rented by the public. See
id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 46.
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unreasonable searches. So you have that language, you know what a
search meant at the time of the founding, sort of knocking on
somebody's door or entering their home, but how do you apply
technology in the modern age? Use of cell phone tracking or a GPS
gizmo on a car or a wiretap or a beeper, how do you as a textualist
know what to do about that?
Scalia: Okay, now that question puts into play not just textualism, but
an aspect of textualism which I believe in, which is called originalism.
That is, you give the words not only their fair meaning, but the fair
meaning that they bore at the time they were adopted. Now, with
respect to phenomena that existed at the time of the Constitution, that's
easy. You know what an unreasonable search at that time was. But
what do you do with new phenomena, as you- as you just talked
about? For new phenomena, you ...
you have to ...
pfff (gesturing
upward with his hand) ...
calculate what, given that this is what an
unreasonable search was at the time of the framing, how would it
apply to this new phenomenon? But you start from that base. And you
know we have a case, the Kyllo case, in which the issue was whether
uh, uh, the police could use, uh, infrared technology to find out what
was going on in a houseWilliams: Whether somebody was growing marijuana.
Scalia: They were growing marijuana. And that would heat the roof
and they could tell by infrared whether that was going on.
Williams: Because they'd be using lamps to grow the plants.

Scalia: They'd be using those heat lamps. And the Court held-I
wrote the opinion, so it must have been an originalist opinion-uh,
that, uh, with this new phenomenon it is achieving exactly what the old
phenomena that the Fourth Amendment was directed at would achieve,
and that is, discovering what is going on in somebody's private home.
And if you're using a new technology to do that very same thing, it's
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
Williams: Doesn't that seem, though, like trying to divine the
Founders' intent? And how is that different from trying to understand
Congressional intent?
Scalia: Well, no, I wouldn't call it divining the Founders' intent. I
would call it, uh, divining or determining what, what the words that the
Founders adopted or that the People ratified in the Fourth Amendment,
what they mean as applied to these new phenomena."l 6
The Justice's explanation for his adoption of the "general use" approach
provides valuable insights into his mode of constitutional interpretation,
particularly as applied to the Fourth Amendment, but it will be unsatisfactory to
many of those who believe the Court, led in this instance by Justice Scalia,
changed rather than interpreted not only the words of the Amendment, but the
understanding that the Framers would have had.

I 16. See Scalia: Judges Should Interpret Words, Not Intent, NBC NEws (Aug. 22,
2012), http://dailynightly.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/22/13416169-scalia-judges-shouldinterpret-words-not-intent?chromedomain=usnews.
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B. What's Wrong with "General Public Use"?
The principal criticisms of "general use" relate to both of the interpretative
goals derived from textualism and originalism that Justice Scalia sought to
achieve in Kyllo. First, there clearly is no direct textual support for the idea that
whether a police investigative activity is a "search" is determined in part by
whether it is aided by something "that is not in general public use." Thermal
imagers and other forms of technology may not have- been known to the
Framers, but there certainly were devices and methods "not in general public
use" in the Eighteenth Century, and that limitation could have been part of the
Fourth Amendment had it occurred to the drafters, or had it been thought
appropriate.
However, as Justice Scalia has explained, the absence of explicit language
within the constitutional text does not-perhaps cannot, and almost certainly
should,not-prevent the Supreme Court from applying protections to citizens
from government actions that were not anticipated by the drafters of that text.
He favored applying the privacy values known to the Framers, as reflected by
the textual language they used and the environment in which they lived, to fill
the gaps.' Notwithstanding his rejection of the suggestion that crafting an
interpretation of those values applied to new phenomena is tantamount to
"divining the Founders' intent," the method seems at least dangerously close to
doing just that.
And so, a second criticism of the "general use" approach to new
phenomena, certainly for originalists, is that it is not true to originalism. Kyllo
posed a relatively simple problem for the originalist: While the concept of
seeing through walls with an infrared scanner may have been quite new, the
concept of the government snooping in someone's house without a warrant is
not. If the principal evil against which the Fourth Amendment was aimed was
the entry into one's home and rummaging through one's effects, prohibiting a
"virtual" entry and rummaging by technological means in the Twenty-First
Century seems consistent with the values of the Framers." 8
Much less clear, however, is the application of the "general use" rule to
surveillance technology that does not invade, or even involve, the sacred space
of the home. Perhaps Justice Scalia's resurrection of the "trespass doctrine" in
Jones is best understood as an avoidance technique used to provide an
acceptable originalist alternative to reasonable expectation of privacy and its

117. See id.
118. Here again, it is tempting to conflate "values" with "intent" when discussing
originalism, even though the words do have differing meanings. Justice Scalia did not use
the word "values" in describing how his methods differ from applying the intent of the
Founders, but the use of the Founders' values seems unavoidable in any effort to discern
whether they would have considered a particular action by the government to have been
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
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unhelpful new baggage, the "general use" rule. A pivot to an old propertybased doctrine may have temporarily avoided dealing with the thorny privacy
expectation problem presented by a GPS tracking device attached to a car,"19
but it cannot distract from the charge that Justice Scalia's opinion in Kyllo
bears an uncomfortable resemblance to judicial activism.
No Justice in living memory more famously and publicly rejected the
notion that the Supreme Court must be free to adopt new interpretations of the
Constitution in order to conform the document to the needs and values of the
present than Justice Scalia. He was quoted as saying,
The only good Constitution is a dead Constitution. The problem with a
living Constitution in a word is that somebody has to decide how it
grows and when it is that new rights . . . come forth. And that's an
enormous responsibility in a democracy to place upon nine lawyers, or
even thirty lawyers. 2 0
In light of his strong belief that the Court owes a duty of loyalty to the
language of the Constitution, and should interpret it only in ways that are
faithful to the understanding of those who wrote it, it is more than ironic that
Justice Scalia would adopt a mode of analysis in the area of Fourth Amendment
law that bears no resemblance to the text, and has precious little logical
connection to the preservation of the core privacy values that text seems
intended to protect. The best argument that can be marshalled in defense of
"general use" is that, at least in the Kyllo case, it worked to protect the sanctity
of the home, a value that assuredly was central in the original meaning of the
Amendment. But it seemed wholly inadequate to the task in Jones, the GPS
tracking case that had nothing to do with domestic privacy, and even in
Jardines,the dog-sniff case in which the sanctity of the home was in jeopardy.

119. Writing in Jardines,Justice Scalia made clear that trespass, and not reasonable
expectation of privacy, was the basis for the Court's holding, and that trespass is to be
viewed as an alternative way to approach questions of the Fourth Amendment's
applicability: "The Katz reasonable-expectations test 'has been added to, not substitutedfor,'
the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and so is
unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by physically intruding on
constitutionally protected areas." 569 U.S. at II (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 409). It may, or
arguably may not, be a trespass to place a GPS tracking device on the outside of a vehicle,
but that position presents somewhat fewer problems than the reasonable expectation of
privacy approach. It is impossible to argue credibly that a GPS tracking device is not "in
general public use" when millions of Americans carry such a device with them every day.
The vehicle, never an "effect" that has garnered much respect from the Supreme Court, is
not a "house," and its movements on public streets are visible to all who care to look.
120. See Bruce Allen Murphy, Justice Antonin Scalia and the 'Dead' Constitution,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2016), https://nyti.ms/20wPtca. I have heard him say much the same
thing in public forums and in private conversation on several occasions. He railed against the
ideas of a "living Constitution" as being illegitimate and of placing the Justices in the
position of being a continuing constitutional convention.
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III. WHERE WE ARE

In light of Jones and Jardines, "search" doctrine can now be said to have
two "heads."' 2 1 Those cases revive, or perhaps more accurately, resurrect from
the dead,1 22 the use of a property-based trespass trigger for Fourth Amendment
protections. Trespass does not supplant the reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis of Katz, however; it merely supplements it by providing an alternative
way to determine whether a search was conducted. 23 In doing so, trespass
simultaneously calls into question the health of the "general use" inquiry, and
presents difficult questions of its own.24
Whatever small merit lies in the "general use" analysis of government
conduct, the Court's long-standing core inquiry into reasonable expectation of
privacy also has never been entirely clear. Part of this confusion has been
engendered by the vagueness inherent in reasonableness, and part stems from
the occasional description of the expectation as "legitimate" rather than
"reasonable." In Smith v. Maryland,125 Justice Blackmun phrased it this way:
"Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of
the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection
can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy'
that has been invaded by government action."'2 6
A. Viewing "Search" Through a Normative Lens
In making these adjectives interchangeable, the Court suggests that no
meaningful distinction exists between them. However, as Professors Joshua
Dressler and Alan Michaels poiit out, "to say that a person has a 'legitimate' or

121. See See DRESSLER ET AL., supra, note 9, § 6.03[A], at 71. Professor Dressler
observes that "it is not possible for a defendant to show that particular government activity
triggers the Fourth Amendment under either the property-right trespass approach that
predated Katz . . .or according to Katzian law." See id.
122. In an article by Professor Orin Kerr, he observes that, "Although Jones purports to
restore a preexisting trespass test, no trespass test existed that the court could restore." See
Orin Kerr, Swabbing a Car Door Handle in a Public Lot to Collect DNA is a Fourth
2017),
(Apr. 24,
POST
WASHINGTON
THE
Search,
Trespass
Amendment
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/24/swabbing-a-cardoor-handle-in-a-public-lot-to-collect-dna-is-a-fourth-amendment-trespasssearch/?utmterm=.c06804eba356.
123. See Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1417 (finding that Katz test has been added-to, not
substituted for, the trespass approach).
124. Orin Kerr described some of these difficulties in considering a case in which a
door handle on an automobile was swabbed for DNA, and the U.S. District Court was forced
to consider the extent to which the law of trespass to chattels could, or should, dictate the
application of the Fourth Amendment. See Kerr, supra, note 122.
125. 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
126. See id.
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'justifiable' expectation of privacy is to draw a normative conclusion-a value
judgment-that the individual has a right to the privacy expectation."1 2 7
Ignoring the distinction between "reasonable" expectation of privacy-an
objective evaluation-and one that is "legitimate" or "justifiable" eliminates or
at least diminishes the consideration of shared values in determining whether
an expectation of privacy "counts." The normative component of a privacy
expectation may skate too close to "subjective expectation" to be embraced
enthusiastically by the Supreme Court, but its pull is undeniable. Several years
ago, I asked the law students in my Advanced Search and Seizure class how
iany of them had an expectation of privacy in their emails. All of the students
indicated that they did. I then asked how many of them, based on what they had
learned about government and private access to email correspondence, believed
that expectation was reasonable. Again, all of the students claimed a reasonable
expectation of privacy, even while they acknowledged that the legal doctrine
was to the contrary. Those beliefs were not based on the cases the students had
studied, or on comments I had made in the class, but rather on a normative
judgment that their correspondence, whether in traditional letter form, or in a
contemporary digital form, was entitled to a rather high degree of protection
from prying eyes.
In essence, the normative evaluation of what constitutes a "search" has
little or nothing to do with the statistical probability that the government will
gain access to information or to a thing. It has everything to do with what
society as a whole thinks "should be" private. In this, it is unlike a subjective
expectation of privacy in which an individual, despite the odds of discovery
and the consensus expectations of the society in which he lives, persists in the
belief that his privacy rights exist and will be maintained. Someone walking
down a crowded public sidewalk with a baggie of marijuana protruding visibly
from his pocket may subjectively believe his contraband is private because it is
no one's business what he has, and no one should be looking. But that belief
would not be either objectively reasonable (the probability of discovery is quite
high) or reasonable in a normative sense (others walking on the sidewalk
wouldn't share the view that contraband exposed to the public is nevertheless
private).
Applying this distinction to the facts in Ciraolo, it may or may not have
been objectively reasonable for Mr. Ciraolo to expect his double privacy
fencing to keep anyone from seeing his marijuana crop. That would depend on
the likelihood that someone would fly over the yard, see and recognize the
plants for what they were, and report that observation to the police. The
Supreme Court, without elaborating on the basis for its conclusion, held that,
"In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine,
it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were

127. See DRESSLER ET AL.,supra, note 9, § 6.03[D][3], at 76.
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constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an
altitude of 1,000 feet." 28 Recall that the fact that the overflight and observation
were "directed at identifying the plants" was, according to the Court,
irrelevant.1 29
The source of so much discontent with the holding in Ciraolo is that minds
will differ about what is "reasonable" to believe.' 30 Many would think, perhaps
not unreasonably, that the likelihood of discovery in this situation is sufficiently
slight that Ciraolo's expectation of privacy deserved constitution protection.
Far from being a scientific or objective calculation, "reasonableness" is itself a
kind of focused guess informed by the life experiences and values of the person
deciding whether the standard has been met. 131
Had a more normative view been taken in Ciraolo, the outcome might have
been very different. Law students, who may not be representative of the general
population, often struggle with the Court's ready dismissal of Ciraolo's privacy
expectations, probably because his efforts to shield his yard from the usual sort
of observation were impressive, and apparently were largely effective. What
constitutes a "search" is not determined by a public opinion poll,1 32 but at the
same time, a gross departure from the public's common-sense understanding of
the limits of surveillance undermines confidence in the Court's willingness to
protect privacy values.
B. The Role of Invasiveness
Were the threshold to Fourth Amendment protections judged in a way that
explicitly incorporates normative judgment, along with an appraisal of the
objective probability of discovery, the search inquiry might better reflect the
kind of originalism espoused by Justice Scalia. Understanding a "search" to
mean government conduct that is "invasive," as opposed to that seen only as
violating a "reasonable" expectation of privacy, more clearly addresses the
actual, but neither the subjective nor the statistically-based, expectations people
have. Surely, the Framers were not worried only about "houses," as evidenced

128. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
129. See id. at 213.
130. Cf. Gerald S. Reamey, When "Special Needs" Meet ProbableCause: Denying the
Devil Benefit of Law, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 300-02, 327-30 (1992) (determining
reasonableness involves ad hoc decision-making and use of reasonableness in "special
needs" searches leads to inconsistency).
131. See id.
132. Public opinion has been advanced, however, as a measure of the degree to which
government surveillance intrudes upon the privacy of citizens, and as a determinate of the
level of suspicion required for such surveillance. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK:
THE NEw GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 32-33 (2007) (stating

that some assessment of societal attitudes about intrusiveness should inform the analysis of
whether surveillance is a "search").
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by the inclusion of persons, papers, and effects within the prohibition on
unreasonable searches. 33 Taken as a whole, and in light of the history and
experience of the Framers, it was the government's exercise of unbounded
power to invade the privacy of "the people" that prompted the textual
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.1 3 4 Viewed with this historically faithful
and-some would say "original," normative understanding-invasiveness
better reflects the standard for initiation of constitutional protection than
whether an expectation of privacy is "legitimate," "justifiable," or
"reasonable."
Since the shift from a property-based definition of search to the Katz
formulation, there also has existed a constant concern among some that the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy can be changed in a moment by the
introduction of new technology or a simple public notice.' 3 5 If society, like my
search and seizure students, has been told that unencrypted email is always
"public," is it no longer possible to have a "reasonable" expectation of privacy
in the contents of one's electronic correspondence? When those students said
they nevertheless believed their email to be private, they were expressing a
shared normative view. Knowing that their houses, papers, and effects were
subject to warrantless search by the King's agents would have meant that
American Colonists could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy, even
though the chance that any one individual would be searched was likely quite
small. But their view that their privacy "rights" were violated by those
occasional intrusions inspired them to create constitutional protection against
such "searches." It is this kind of intuitive sense of what counts as excessive
governmental intrusion that matters at least as much as any empirical evidence
that people's expectations are reasonable.
An example of this normative influence can be seen in the Supreme
Court's treatment in Bond v. United States.' 36 During the course of a stop of the
bus on which Mr. Bond was riding for an immigration check at a Border Patrol
checkpoint, the border patrol agent felt and "squeezed" Bond's bag that had

133. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .. . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (emphasis added).
134. It has been argued that the desire of the Framers to curb the government's power,
and not merely to protect the people's privacy, motivated the Fourth Amendment. See Ohm,
supra, note 56, at 1334. My argument that the prohibition of unreasonable searches
necessarily includes governmental "invasions" reflects some agreement with this view. If the
thrust of the Fourth Amendment is to limit the power imbalance between the government
and its people, its protections should extend beyond the current, crabbed understanding that
"reasonable expectation" has been given.
135. See Ohm, supra note 56, at 1320 (stating that "no expectation of privacy will be
deemed reasonable in a world without privacy").
136. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
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been placed in the bin above his seat.'1 7 Feeling a "brick-like" object in the bag,
3
the agent opened it and discovered a "brick" of methamphetamine. ' The
majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, distinguished this
"search" from the observation in Ciraolo, holding that, "physically invasive
inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection."'39 This is so,
according to the Court, because "travelers are particularly concerned about
their carry-on luggage; they generally use it to transport personal items that, for
whatever reason, they prefer to keep close at hand."' 40
It is noteworthy that in both Bond and Ciraolo, the observations were made
from a public space and the defendants exposed themselves to that public
observation. As the Court noted in Bond, travelers expect that their luggage and
personal items placed in an overhead bin will be subjected to a certain amount
41
of touching, moving, jostling, and handling by fellow travelers and others.1 In
deciding that the agent's manipulation of Bond's bag was a "search," the Court
relied on differences in the degree of invasion or intrusion to conclude that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Surely, any traveler on the bus could have manipulated the bag to the same
extent and, as any traveler must know, it is not uncommon for one's belongings
to be handled by others.1 The difference apparently lay in the degree of
manipulation. Members of the majority seemed offended by the probing for
evidence, not expressly because of the agent's investigative intent,1 43 but
because he felt the bag in "an exploratory manner."1 44 In reaching this
conclusion, the Justices were relying on a normative view that the agent had
simply gone too far, perhaps because, as members of the traveling public
themselves, the idea of a government agent trying to feel what they had placed
in the overhead bin was personally offensive.
Using normative analysis is not without its disadvantages. One of the chief
among these is that it does not tie the Fourth Amendment to a fixed point of
development. That is, as values and commonly-held beliefs change, so does the
45
meaning of privacy, and with it, the application of constitutional protection.
137. See id. at 335-36.
138. See.id.
139. Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
140. See id. at 337-38.
141. See id. at 338.
142. See id. (stating that bus passengers clearly expect their bags may be handled).
143. The court of appeals, citing Ciraolo, explicitly rejected the idea that the agent's
purpose in squeezing the bag mattered. See United States v. Bond, 167 F.3d 225, 227 (5th
Cir. 1999) (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 210).
144. See 529 U.S. at 338-39.
145. This is, of course, also an advantage in that normative analysis not only allows,
but requires, consultation of changing notions of privacy. The impact of technological
innovation can be accounted for relatively quickly once it is understood that determinations
are necessarily ad hoc, even though they are guided by static core principles.
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In addition to this common critique of the "living Constitution" is the difficulty
inherent in deciding who should say what these values are, and whether those
values are offended by the government's conduct in a given case. But the
problem with a "reasonable expectation of privacy" approach is that it also does
not tie the Fourth Amendment to a fixed point of development. As discussed,
the determination of reasonableness is hardly clear and certain, and ultimately it
is the opinion of a majority of nine lawyers that resolves the question, just as it
would be if those same arbiters were thinking about a problem in more
normative terms.
A normative analysis, when done accurately, reflects the shared values of
society, and adherence to those understandings produces more readily accepted
outcomes. Here, the difficulty lies in knowing what those values are. If my law
students believe that their email is private, for example, is that a shared
understanding? If so, is that understanding one that society at large would
accept?
To the extent that the intent of the Framers is considered, it must be
conceded that they were motivated by the offense of invasion of their houses,
papers, and effects. A normative approach to the Fourth Amendment would be
faithful to the same motivation, limiting the government's intrusion into those
places and things that "the people" believe should be private. 4 6 On the other
hand, normative analysis largely ignores the statistical probability that any of
these places or things will be discovered by the government, an important
consideration in its own right.
C. Investigative Intent
If the Bond opinion contains normative elements, it also implicitly
recognizes that investigative intent plays a role in determining whether a
probing for evidence is a "search." As noted, the Bond majority seemed
offended by the agent's touching the bag in "an exploratory manner." 47 What
distinguishes an "exploratory" feeling from one that is "non-exploratory" if not
the purpose behind the tactile investigation? While the Supreme Court
generally has disavowed reliance on an officer's investigative intent in
evaluating whether a search occurred,148 its stance has shifted somewhat in
146. Professor Slobogin captured this idea in the promotion of his "proportionality
principle":
Thus, if the proportionality and exigency principles ruled, courts could more easily
avoid the temptation to define the Fourth Amendment threshold in terms of
assumptions of risk, and might be more willing to speak of that threshold in the
terms Katz has always stood for: expectations of privacy society recognizes as
reasonable.
See Slobogin, supra, note 132, at 211.
147. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39.
148. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736 (2011) (holding that Fourth
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recent cases.
In Floridav. Jardines,149 for example, the majority held that bringing a
trained narcotics dog up the sidewalk of a home for the purpose of sniffing
around the front door in order to detect marijuana odors emanating from the
Ordinarily, when
house was unlike the usual approach to a residence.'
someone approaches a door and knocks, that person's entry onto the land and
approach are permitted for a limited time and purpose. As Justice Scalia
explained, "[t]his implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the
home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then
5
(absent invitation to linger longer) leave."' ' But then he observed in his

majority opinion that, "[t]he scope of a license-express or implied-is limited
not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.
Clearly, the fact that the officers went to Jardines's home with a drug dog
to investigate unverified information that the defendant was growing marijuana
in his residence convinced the Court that this was not a social call, or even a
"knock and talk," but rather was a deliberate attempt to confirm the tip by
allowing the drug dog to sniff around the front door of the home,
53
accomplishing something visual surveillance could not.' The State appears
54
understandably to have relied on Ashcroft v. al-Kiddl and Whren v. United
States' for its argument that the subjective intentions of the officers were
irrelevant. In Whren, Justice Scalia himself wrote for the majority that,
"[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
57
Amendment analysis,"56 a position he reiterated later in al-Kidd.
Rather than apply the Court's "intent of the officer is irrelevant"
philosophy in Jardines,Justice Scalia distinguished its prior holdings:"
The State points to our decisions holding that the subjective intent of
the officer is irrelevant .

. .

. [T]hose cases merely hold that a stop or

search that is objectively reasonable is not vitiated by the fact that the
officer's real reason for making the stop or search has nothing to do
with the validating reason.
Amendment inquiry is an objective inquiry); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996) (holding that constitutional reasonableness does not depend on the actual motivations
of the officers involved).
149. 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013).
150. See id. at 1416.
151. Id. at 1415.

152. Id. at 1416 (emphasis added).
153. See id. at 1413-18.
154. See 563 U.S. 731.
155. See 517 U.S. 806.
156. Id. at 813.
157. See 563 U.S. at 736.

158. See Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1416-17.
159. See id. at 1416 (emphasis in original).
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The Supreme Court has not been consistent in its treatment of the role of
investigative intent, sometimes making that intent the distinguishing factor in
what is, and what is not, a search.1 60 While Whren and al-Kidd dealt with
claims of pretext stops, other cases involving inventory "search" and detentions
based on a community caretaking function have made clear that an officer's
investigative motive disqualifies a procedure as one of either of those two
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant preference.' 6 ' The import of
these cases is simple: If the police are investigating a crime and their actions
are prompted by that investigation, the "ordinary" Fourth Amendment
protections of probable cause, warrant, and prior judicial authorization apply.
However, if the police action is not a criminal investigation, but is done for
some "special need" or regulatory or administrative purpose, Fourth
Amendment protections are eased or even disappear.1 62 The simple, central
notion behind these holdings is that the protections of the probablecause/warrant scheme should not be abandoned when law enforcement officers
are investigating crime.
A significant, if contradictory, recognition of the importance of
investigative intent in the "search" context comes from another "new
technology" case written by Justice Scalia. In Jones, the GPS-tracking case in
which the Court relied on the trespass doctrine, the majority approved this
language: "A trespass on 'houses' or 'effects,' or a Katz invasion of privacy, is
not alone a search unless it is done to obtain information; and the obtaining of
information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a trespass or
invasion of privacy." 63
Investigative motive, the intention to act in order "to obtain information,"

160. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (holding that
inventory cannot be based on investigative motive); Corbin v. State, 85 S.W 3d. 272, 277
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that community caretaking function cannot be based on
non-community caretaking motive). In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, a plurality of the
Supreme Court imposed an "inadvertence" requirement on plain-view seizures of evidence.
See 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971). While Coolidge did not address the threshold question of
whether investigative intent or motive plays a part in determining whether police activity
constitutes a "search," it demonstrates the concern of some members of the Court that, given
the opportunity, law enforcement investigators could exploit the plain-view doctrine to avoid
the judicial oversight of the warrant process. See id. at 470-71. The inadvertence requirement
was later disavowed in Horton v. California,496 U.S. 128 (1990).
161. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1976) (holding that as in
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), which first articulated "community caretaking"
grounds for warrantless search, there was no indication that vehicle inventory was conducted
with an investigative motive); Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
(holding that the search in Cady was not conducted to uncover evidence of criminal activity).
162. See Reamey, supra, note 130 (chronicling the various administrative and "special
needs" searches that do not require probable cause or a warrant, and sometimes require no
individualized suspicion at all).
163. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5 (emphasis added).
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is a sine qua non of the constitutional meaning of "search." That motive may be
insufficient by itself to trigger Fourth Amendment protection, but it is an
indispensable component of the conduct that does.
IV. RE-SHAPING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

In spite of efforts by some members of the Supreme Court to faithfully and
consistently interpret privacy protection from the government in an originalist
fashion, the Fourth Amendment cases remain, as Roger Dworkin said in 1973,
"a mess." 64 The current confusion of views makes the "search" issue seem
more like a tiny house to which has been tacked on additions and renovations,
each of which was designed to address a need of its time. Coherency has been
lost. Some of the additions arguably never served their original purpose very
well, while others appear to be vestigial structures in search of a new purpose.
Notwithstanding the Court's assurances to the contrary regarding the
constancy of its policy,1 65 the trespass doctrine held sway for a considerable
period, only to be replaced by a focus on reasonable expectation of privacy
divorced from any consideration of whether a property incursion occurred.
Trespass was then restored, albeit in a poorly defined manner, to the search
analysis, but this time it was to be used as an alternative, or perhaps in addition,
to reasonable expectation of privacy. Each of these varying views of the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment undoubtedly reflected an attempt at a
"better" and more faithful understanding of the scant text, but the result of this
shifting notion of what constitutes a search surely contributed to uncertainty
among law enforcement, legal professionals, and lower courts' 66 as they have
struggled to apply the concept de jour to situations that could not have been
imagined at the time of the framing.
The trespass doctrine was doomed from its inception. Its primary flaw is
that its conception of the Fourth Amendment has much more to do with
physical intrusion or invasion of spaces than it does with privacy in the larger
sense. Surely, forcible police entry into a private home is invasive, and surely
the Framers were sensitive to the privacy violation a forcible entry entails. But
privacy can be violated by means other than physical invasion. This realization
led the Supreme Court in Katz to observe famously that,
164. See Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The
Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973).
165. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 405-07 (holding that Katz did not repudiate the
understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government
trespass upon the areas it enumerates).
166. See Weaver, supra, note 14, at 239 (stating that decisions post-Katz have not
articulated a satisfactory replacement for Katz test and some Justices have suggested that a
new approach is necessary to address technology); See generally Kaitlyn R. O'Leary, Note,
What the FoundersDid Not See Coming: The Fourth Amendment, Digital Evidence, and the
Plain View Doctrine, 46 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 211 (2013).
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[A]lthough a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that
surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any
material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since
departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed,
we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only
the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of
oral statements, overheard without any "technical trespass under ...
local property law." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511.
Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people - and not simply "areas"-against
unreasonable search and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of
that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.16 7

This first major re-shaping of the Fourth Amendment to expand its reach to
intangible objects obtained without violating a physical space in which the
suspect could claim a protected interest marked deeper and more nuanced
recognition of the broad interests encompassed by people, houses, papers, and
effects.
While the limited and archaic property-focused view of the trespass
doctrine gave way to a more malleable and privacy-centered construction,
reasonable expectation of privacy has always had its own problems. 6 8 The
division of privacy expectation into a subjective and objective prong made
things worse in some cases. The subjective expectation, which is always
claimed by someone who feels invaded, offers little help in the determination
of whether a search has occurred. When it plays a role, subjective expectation
usually is employed to deny a person Fourth Amendment protection without
reaching the question of whether the expectation was reasonable. At best, a
subjective expectation inquiry plays a very limited gatekeeping function.
Reasonable expectation, on the other hand, is hardly a "bright-line rule,"
and probably shouldn't be. Its very flexibility is both its strength and its
weakness, creating a scope for the Fourth Amendment that trespass could not
provide by itself, while simultaneously assuring uncertainty in the absence of a
clear and consistent articulation of the Court's understanding of what
expectations are "reasonable," and why.1 69 That kind of consistent

167. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
168. See Maclin, supra, note 15, at 73-75 (arguing that the focus in Katz on people
rather than places without explicating the protections to which "people" are entitled, strips
the decision of substance. Its "malleability and emptiness" rendered Katz "especially
vulnerable in cases involving technological change."); Weaver, supra, note 14, at 237
(promise of Katz has remained unfulfilled as Supreme Court struggled to apply reasonable
expectation of privacy).
169. See Maclin, supra, note 15, at 79 (stating that due to Katz's lack of substance,
"[e]xpectations theory and risk analysis replaced Katz as the defining methodology").
Professor Wayne LaFave notes that,
[W]hile Katz "has rapidly become the basis of a new formula of fourth amendment
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conceptualization is all the more challenging when the Court faces an everchanging barrage of surveillance and detection techniques.
Expectations, unlike trespass, must be evaluated in light of rapidly
emerging knowledge about what information the Government can and does
acquire, and how it acquires it. As noted previously, expectations can be
manipulated or destroyed by simply announcing, for example, that all cell
phone communication is being intercepted and screened, or that drones will
henceforth conduct 24-hour surveillance of a neighborhood.1 7 0 Even if no overt
attempt is made to change privacy expectations, they nevertheless will change
merely because a "new" technology becomes commonplace or ubiquitous. The
GPS tracking capability known to be built into smart phones today might well
defeat any argument that accessing tracking data associated with that phone is a
search."
Reasonable expectation also is deficient if viewed in a strictly objective
fashion, as the phrase implies. As discussed earlier in this article, one of the
reasons the result in Ciraolo is unsatisfactory is because the Court takes a
17 2
quasi-empirical approach to the determination of reasonableness. Mr. Ciraolo
seems to the reader of the opinion to have had a privacy expectation that, at
coverage," it can hardly be said that the Court produced clarity where theretofore
there had been uncertainty. If anything, the exact opposite has occurred. The preKatz rule, though perhaps "unjust," was "a workable tool for the reasoning of the
courts." But the Katz rule, which the Court has since-somewhat inaccuratelystated as the "reasonable 'expectation of privacy"'-test, is by comparison
"difficult to apply."
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(b) (5th ed. 2017).
170. See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 384 (1974):
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement
of what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can
neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth
amendment protection. If it could, the government could diminish each person's
subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television
that 1984 was being advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being
placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance.
Id.
171. See Slobogin, supra, note 132, at 208 (writing that "general public use" stems
from the notion that privacy cannot be expected from technology we should know ordinary
people use every day); Brian L. Owsley, Cell Phone Tracking in the Era of United States v.
Jones and Riley v. California, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 207, 208-09 (2015) (commenting that
many cell phones have GPS tracking capability, allowing the location of the phone to be
determined within ten meters); Aaron Smith, Record shares of Americans now own
smartphones, have home broadband, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/12/evolution-of-technology.
172. The Court in Ciraolo based its opinion on the flying public being able to view the
marijuana without addressing the likelihood that anyone actually would have done so. The
opinion assumes that the risk of discovery was high, and neglects the possibility that it really
was quite low. The majority merely notes that, "[a]ny member of the public flying in this
airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed."
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
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least, was not unreasonable." While the Court neglected to discuss the
frequency of flights over the property, unless Ciraolo was growing marijuana
directly under, or closely to the side of, a flight or glide path, the odds seem
very much to favor his apparent belief that two privacy fences around the
perimeter of the property would suffice. And yet, the Court took the view that
because someone could fly over in navigable airspace and see the crop, any
privacy expectation Ciraolo had was unreasonable.
Had the Ciraolo Court infused its judgment with a normative aspect, as it
did in Bond, its decision might have been different, and more satisfactory. At
least, consideration of how society might view the adequacy of Ciraolo's
efforts to maintain privacy would have provided an important insight that
empirically-based objectivity alone lacked.
None of this is to say that reasonable expectation of privacy and the core
principle of the trespass doctrine play no legitimate role in deciding whether the
Fourth Amendment applies to particular governmental action. Rather, it is to
say that exclusive reliance on either one, or even on both, as they are currently
formulated and most often used, is inadequate to the task of applying the
Constitution to newly-developed or newly-deployed surveillance technologies.
Investigative motive or intent also has played a part in holding that what
law enforcement officers did was a "search." 7 4 Indeed, Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority in Jones, rejected the view that mere trespass or violation of a
reasonable expectation of privacy could be a search "unless it is done to obtain
information."' While intent or motive has been employed reluctantly by the
Court due to the difficulty inherent in discerning what an officer, or anyone
else, is thinking, and what motivates their act, it is not impossible for factfinders to reach conclusions about the thought processes of actors.' Courts do
this all the time. 7 7
Had the Court used investigative intent or motive in deciding the Ciraolo
case, that factor obviously would have weighed in favor of affording
constitutional protection to the defendant."7 The interpretation of the Fourth

173. In fact, the California Court of Appeals found the expectation quite reasonable.
See California v. Ciraolo, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
174. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. 400; Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39 (noting that agent felt
bag in "exploratory manner"); Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1417 (concluding that purpose for
which officers entered property determines whether dog-sniff was a search).
175. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5.
176. See Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment

Reasonableness Analysis, 81 Miss. L.J. 1133, 1176 (2012) (discerning the subjective intent
of a government actor may be difficult, but proof of intent is required in other areas of law).
177. See, e.g., Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376 (holding that inventory cannot be based on
investigative motive); Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277 (holding that community caretaking
function cannot be based on non-community caretaking motive); Lee, supra, note 176, at
1176.
178. The obvious investigative motive demonstrated by the deputies' overflight in
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Amendment is not subject to the results of a social media poll or popular
election, but courts could and should consider both investigative motive and
normative values in deciding whether the Fourth Amendment applies. Doing so
would contribute to de-mystifying the threshold for constitutional protection
and bringing cases more in line with the expectations of the public generally.
The current view of a "search" incorporates reasonable expectation of
privacy, along with a version of trespass to property. But characterizing the
state of affairs so simply masks the problems inherent in application of either
trespass doctrine or expectation of privacy. "Trespass," for example, usually
connotes a physical invasion of a space without consent. 7 9 In Jones, Justice
Scalia characterized placement of the GPS tracking device in this way: "The
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
80
According to the opinion, this was a "physical intrusion."' 8
information."o
But in what sense did the attachment of a small tracking device constitute a
physical intrusion? The device was affixed to the outside of the vehicle without
invading its interior,' 82 and would not have been considered a sufficient
trespass under Olmstead v. United States 8 3 or Goldman v. United States's4 to
amount to a search, even in the heyday of trespass doctrine. Those cases were
discredited by Katz,'85 but if the "Government physically occupied private
property" in the Jones case, it did so in a very minimal way. The
"invasiveness" or "intrusion" that occurred in Jones was not offensive because
the government attached by magnets or adhesive a small box of miniature
electronic components.'8 6 It was an offense to Jones' privacy because it was
Ciraolo would have precluded any application of the plain-view (or perhaps, more
appropriately "plane-view") doctrine if the "view" had been required to be inadvertent, as in
Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443. Shortly after Ciraolo was decided, though, the plurality preference
for inadvertence in plain-view situations-a preference that never gained much traction
among the justices-was abandoned in Horton, 496 U.S. 128.
179. Black's Law Dictionary includes as a definition of "trespass" the following: "An
unlawful act committed against the person or property of another; esp., wrongful entry on
another's real property." Trespass,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
180. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
181. See id. at 411.
182. The device was attached to the undercarriage of Jones' Jeep Grand Cherokee. See
id. at 402-03.
183. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438.
184. See 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
185. See 389 U.S. at 353.
186. In an interesting application of the post-Jones trespass test, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that it was a "search" for
investigators to swab the door handle of a suspect's vehicle in order to obtain a DNA sample
for comparison purposes. See Schmidt v. Stassi, 250 F.Supp.3d 99 (E.D. La. 2017). Noting
that the search "involved the physical touching" of the vehicle in a public parking lot that
"did not damage the [vehicle] in any way," the court concluded that, contrary to the prior law
of trespass to chattels, the better view is that trespass does not require damage to the owner's
property. See id. at 103-04. For a discussion of this case and its implications, see Kerr, supra,
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intended to provide the government large amounts of data about every
movement of his vehicle over an extended period of time.' 87 It was the degree
of intrusion-not physical intrusion, but intrusion into the private life and
movements of Mr. Jones-that readily leads to the normative judgment that the
suspect was "searched." Arguably, Jones' expectation that his movements
would not be tracked, at least not for as long or with such close scrutiny, was
reasonable, although the Court chose not to rely on that mode of analysis. In
fact, it ignored the Government's argument that the underbody of Jones' Jeep
was not an area in which he had a reasonable expectation of privacy, preferring
to rely for its holding on trespass doctrine." If this was intended to avoid a
contentious discussion about the areas of a vehicle in which one can expect
privacy, it merely substituted for this discussion a much more controversial
one. 189
Borrowing a page from Jardines, the Jones majority acknowledged
obliquely that the purpose to gather information is an indispensable element of
a search. Although the Court did not explain in Jones the degree to which this
factor mattered in the outcome, perhaps because of the majority's reliance on
trespass, it nevertheless was said to be part of any search.' 90 Jardines, hardly a
"new technology" case, nevertheless relied overtly on investigative intent in
distinguishing the officers' approach to the house in that case from a nonsearch approach. 91
A. Adding Durability to Fourth Amendment Analysis
These recent cases suggest a better way to think about whether an
investigative technique, and particularly one that is extraordinary or innovative,
should be subjected to the usual Fourth Amendment requirements. This
approach retains much of what the Court has done, but re-conceptualizes"reshapes"-the analytical construct:
Reasonable expectation of privacy should continue to be the linchpin in
deciding what it means to "search," but the present understanding of that
concept should be reconfigured to infuse it with normative values, 9 2 and that
note 122.
187. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 403-04 (stating that the device established vehicle's
location within 50 to 100 feet, transmitted it via cell phone to a government computer, and
relayed more than 2,000 pages of data over a four-week period).
188. See id. at 406.
189. See Schmidt, 250 F. Supp. 3d 99 (swabbing a door handle to obtain DNA held to
be a search); Kerr, supra,note 122.
190. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5 (trespass alone does not qualify as a search; there
must also be an attempt to find something or to obtain information).
191. See Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1416-17 (implying license to enter suspect's porch
depended on purpose for which officers entered).
192. See DRESSLER ET AL., supra, note 9 (concluding that Justice Harlan's normative
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should be done expressly and consistently. This may, and should, result in a
departure from any rigid application of the "third-party doctrine.
The investigative motive or intent of law enforcement must be a factor in
deciding whether a "search" has occurred, although it should not be a
dispositive factor.
Physical trespass in the traditional sense should be rejected as a per se
determinative factor for "search." Instead, the underlying value of the trespass
doctrine-the degree of invasiveness or intrusion suffered by the person
94
subjected to the investigative technique-should be considered.1
1. Back to the Future of Reasonableness Inquiry
When, as in Bond, the Court feels itself drawn to the conclusion that police
conduct seems to have gone too far in exploring the person or effects of a
suspect, it is time to say that more clearly and rely on that normative value
more explicitly. The real trouble with reasonable expectation of privacy is that
it doesn't put sufficient emphasis on a broad understanding of what is
"reasonable." Reasonableness cannot be merely the product of a statistical
analysis of the risk a person runs by the way in which he conducts himself or
exposes his conduct,1 95 although that kind of analysis plays an important role,
too.
Adopting a more holistic view of reasonable expectation of privacy is
96
faithful to the Court's shift in that direction in Katz.1 It also captures the
public's sentiment in regulating police practices and promotes confidence that
the values held by most of society-values that motivated adoption of the
approach to searches was correct).
193. See Ohm, supra, note 56, at 1331-32 (eliminating the third-party doctrine is
necessary but not sufficient).
194. Professor Christopher Slobogin has explored the idea of considering intrusion in
its many degrees, requiring more or less supporting suspicion to justify surveillance
depending on the extent to which it intrudes upon or invades a person's privacy, something
he has characterized as the "proportionality principle." See Slobogin, supra, note 132, at 210.
My own suggestion regarding intrusion or invasiveness is simply that courts consider in
deciding whether the government's conduct was a "search" whether, and to what extent, it
invaded a privacy interest. I find considerable merit in Professor Slobogin's more
sophisticated and elaborated notions of exactly which kinds of surveillance are more
intrusive than others, and to what extent. Not all scholars, of course, believe this approach
would be an improvement over the status quo. See Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need A New Fourth
Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 951-52 (2009) (arguing that the proportionality principle is
not a conceptual improvement over the current view of the Fourth Amendment).
195. A purely statistical approach to reasonableness assumes that verifiable and
accurate statistics for the conduct exist, that judges and lawyers know how to access and
interpret these studies, and-most importantly-that the risks could be used with reasonable
effectiveness by everyone subject to police surveillance.
196. See 389 U.S. at 350 (holding that Fourth Amendment protects more than
"constitutionally protected areas" but does not create a general right to privacy).
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Fourth Amendment-are being upheld. Admittedly, the "fuzziness" of
normative values is easily a match for the uncertainty of the meaning of
"reasonableness,"' 9 7 but confidence does not grow from pretending that
something is fixed and knowable when it obviously is not.' 9 8
To be sure, Justice Scalia's observation that nine lawyers are poorly
equipped to decide on what the "living Constitution" means, captures a
difficulty that is compounded by adding a layer of normative analysis.' 99
Whether this makes the work of the trial court more difficult, though, is hard to
evaluate. If the current reasonableness inquiry is hard, is a somewhat different
reasonableness inquiry harder? This evaluative task seems particularly well
suited to a group of ordinary citizens like the ones found on a jury. Ordinarily,
suppression issues are decided initially by a trial judge, but in some states, the
jury has "another bite at the apple" and can place its own view of governmental
overreach in play. 2 00 Perhaps a better solution to deciding values-laden issues is
to employ a mixed bench of professional and lay judges, but that mechanism,
201
o
used in many other countries,
seems out of reach in the United States.
Nevertheless, some role for lay judges or jurors in applying normative
considerations to the current reasonableness determination may prove an
effective way to enhance the credibility of outcomes.

197. See Ohm, supra, note 56, at 1333 ("[T]he problem with the purely normative
inquiry is its imprecision and variability.").
198. See Pearlman & Lee, supra, note 57, at 755-56 (stating that the use of social
media and networks have resulted in changing norms and differing views of what is
"reasonable").
199. See DRESSLER & ET AL., supra, note 9 (researching public attitudes would prevent
the normative judgment to be solely that of the majority of the Supreme Court of the United
States).
200. For example, in Texas a defendant whose suppression motion and objection to the
introduction of evidence allegedly seized unlawfully have been denied may nevertheless be
entitled to a jury instruction requiring the jury to consider the lawfulness anew and not to
consider any evidence that in the jury's view was obtained in violation of the law. See TEX.
CRIM.PROC. CODE ANN. Art. 38.23(a) (2017):
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be
instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was
obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the
jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.
See also Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 509-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
201. See, e.g., Christoph Safferling, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 8 (2001) (describing reforms to the German criminal procedure in 1924 that
brought about the abolition of the jury and the introduction of a mixed bench of lay and
professional judges); Richard S. Frase, France, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE
STUDY 2d. ed. 219 (edited by Craig M. Bradley 2007) (detailing Assize courts which consist
of three professional judges and nine lay judges sitting together in a mixed bench); RICHARD
VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Ch. 12 (2005) (reviewing the "European
jury").
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2. Giving Weight to Motive
Identifying the investigative motive or intent of law enforcement is much
easier. Knowing how to use it, and the degree to which it should influence the
outcome, is not. As Jardines and Jones demonstrate, the Court at least
sometimes incorporates this factor into its decision making, notwithstanding its
reluctance to delve into the motives of officers.202 This occasional use of
motive by the Court suggests that its use could be expanded to help define
search.
This article began with the Ciraolo case, an instance of police surveillance
using older technology, but using it in a somewhat unexpected way. The
dissatisfaction with the Ciraolo opinion and holding often stems in large part
from the blatant, focused, and intentional manner in which information about
Mr. Ciraolo's back yard was obtained. The observation was not accidental or
coincidental; it was a deliberate search 203 for evidence of criminal activity. As
the California Court of Appeal held,
From the perspective of defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy
we deem it significant that the aerial surveillance of his backyard was
not the result of a routine patrol conducted for any other legitimate law
enforcement or public safety objective, but was undertaken for the
specific purpose of observing this particular enclosure within
defendant's curtilage.204
Intent to uncover such evidence cannot by itself define a "search" for
Fourth Amendment purposes, of course. Were it to do so, every investigative
activity, including parking beside a roadway to watch for speeding motorists,
would be a "search" requiring some level of suspicion. If "search" were
broadened to that extent, the Court's recourse might well be to tinker with, and
lessen, the standards for reasonable suspicion and probable cause. On the other
hand, throwing out the "baby" that motive represents is not justified by fear that
excessively aggressive implementation by courts eventually will produce harm
to the system of individualized suspicion.
It is time, as in Jardines,to recognize that motive matters. If that reasoning
had been applied by the Supreme Court in Ciraolo, the result might or might
not have been the same, but it would have been better received in either event.
Investigative motive, like normative focus, is obviously a part of the calculation
202. See supra, note 144 (bus passenger's bag handled in an "exploratory manner").
203. I use the word "search" here without its constitutional meaning, but as a
commonly-understood word describing what the officer in Ciraolo was doing when he
looked down trying to see the marijuana crop. Any layperson would understand the deputy's
actions to be a search, although the Supreme Court held that it was not. The divide between
the ordinary meaning of "search" and its legal definition illustrates a significant problem
with "reasonable expectation of privacy" and the usual unwillingness to consider
investigative motive or intent.
204. See People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1089 (1984).
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made by "the People" who are protected by the Fourth Amendment when they
consider whether they are being "searched." It should be used by courts, too,
and used in a more overt fashion.
Considering motive also seems consistent with the original meaning of the
constitutional language. The impetus for the Fourth Amendment was deliberate
invasion by government officers. To say that the investigative motive doesn't
matter is to say that accidental discovery stands on the same constitutional
footing as what is uncovered by intentional inquiry, and of course it does not.205
The Court usually is unconcerned with investigative motivation when it
considers search; the focus is instead on the mental state of the person being
searched,2 06 and whether that person had a subjective privacy expectation that
was reasonable. Ironically, the Court has had no difficulty discerning the
mental state of the person who has been searched, but finds it too difficult to
delve into the mental state of the officer conducting the investigation.2 0 7
Investigative motive matters, and it is not unduly difficult to determine.
Laypersons would be unlikely to consider the coincidental discovery of a
controlled substance in a house where a warrant was being executed for stolen
property to be the product of a "search" for the controlled substance. On the
other hand, discovery of a controlled substance by an officer who entered the
home on the pretext that she was checking for a possible gas leak would strike
most people as a governmental search.20 8 Less formalism and more
acknowledgment of what the citizenry understands the Constitution to mean
would go a long way toward instilling confidence in the actions and institutions
of government.
3. A New View of an Old Doctrine: Trespass
Physical trespass, when viewed in the narrow traditional sense of property
rights, is not only an archaic factor, but is one that previously has been rejected

205. See, e.g., Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469-71 (holding inadvertent discovery required to
dispense with warrant requirement in plain-view cases), overruled by Horton, 496 U.S. 128
(holding inadvertence not required for plain-view).
206. Cf. Lee, supra, note 176, at 1176-77 (discerning the subjective intent of a
government actor may be difficult, but proof of intent is required in other areas of law).
207. Cf. Horton, 496 U.S. at 138 ("evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by
the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the
subjective state of mind of the officer").
208. The "pretext arrest" doctrine was alive and well for a period in Texas, and during
that time Texas courts looked at facts and circumstances shedding light on the true motive of
the arresting officer. See Black v. State, 739 S.W. 2d 240, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987),
overruled by Gordon v. State, 801 S.W. 2d 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (concluding that
traffic stop by homicide detectives who wanted to question driver about a killing was a
pretext stop rather than a stop for traffic violations).
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for very good reason. 209 "Search" has more to do with privacy than it has to do
with security, a concern more properly addressed by the "seizure" component
of the Fourth Amendment.21 0 Seen in the light of privacy concerns rather than
property security concerns, the problem in Jones, the GPS-tracking case, was
not that the government invaded the physical space of the suspect, but rather
that its use of the device invaded the privacy of Mr. Jones by tracking and
relaying to law enforcement great quantities of data about his movements, data
that realistically could not have been obtained through mere observation.
Similarly, in Ciraolo one might say that no physical trespass occurred
when the deputy flew over the marijuana patch, but that misses the
constitutional point. Ciraolo's privacy was invaded, even if his backyard was
not,211 a point that the Court grasped and applied in Katz when it held that the
listening device attached to the outside of a public phone booth in order to
capture the suspect's conversation was a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Ciraolo isn't unsatisfactory because the opinion's analysis
focused on privacy interests rather than physical intrusion. It is unsatisfactory
because it ignores many of the considerations that a full evaluation of invasion
of privacy would entail.212
"Trespass" is important only insofar as it encompasses "invasiveness." The
Framers could not have been so concerned about the breaking of the invisible
barrier of property rights surrounding their homes and places of work as they
were about the intrusion into or invasion of private places, papers,
conversations, and effects. When the drug-sniffing dog was taken onto the
porch in Jardines to detect controlled substances within the residence, it was
not the entry onto the owner's property that offended the Fourth Amendment
privacy protections. It was the deliberate, and successful, attempt by the
government to find out what was happening within the home-the virtual
invasion of that space we all expect to be free from unwarranted snooping. In
this sense, Justice Scalia's opinion in Kyllo correctly focused on the core issue,
not whether the information was obtained from outside the property bounds or
by intruding onto the suspect's property, but by worrying about what the

209. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209 (detailing that the marijuana in defendant's yard was
identified by officers flying over at an altitude of 1,000 feet).
210. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,
Privacy, or Security, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307, 344-50 (1998) (arguing that guarantee
that seizures be reasonable, as in Terry v. Ohio, involves the protection of security, but
privacy remains the principal object of the Fourth Amendment).
211. It might be said that some "virtual trespass" occurred, either because obtaining
visual access to a protected space constituted a kind of trespass, or because the aircraft
invaded physical space above the land that was "owned" by Ciraolo. The latter argument is
addressed in the Court's opinion by its discussion of public, navigable airspace, airspace to
which Mr. Ciraolo had no exclusive right of access. See Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 213-14.
212. In respect to Ciraolo, the Katz holding has been characterized as "impotent." See
Maclin, supra, note 15, at 82.
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thermal-imager disclosed about what was happening inside the home.2 13 Danny
Kyllo might reasonably have expected that the activities in his residence would
remain private from the snooping eye of the government's infrared detection
device, even though the government did not physically trespass any more than
did the deputy in Ciraolo. Although the Court did not rely on investigative
motive in reaching its conclusion that Kyllo's home was searched unlawfully, if
that factor had been considered, it clearly would have weighed on the suspect's
side of the balance.
For these reasons, physical trespass, by itself, should not determine
whether a search has occurred. Relying on trespass, even in part, shifts the
focus of the Fourth Amendment from privacy to a surrogate for privacy that
sometimes misses the point of the inquiry completely. Only to the extent that
trespass reveals the degree of invasion or intrusion into a private place should it
have value in deciding whether a search has occurred, and whether
constitutional privacy protections apply.

4. The Misguided "Public Use" Approach
The constitutional problem posed by rapidly changing investigative
techniques, many of which are made possible by technological advances,
cannot be solved entirely by resort to doctrines and modes of analysis
developed in simpler times. The "general public use" formula used by Justice
Scalia in Kyllo, and earlier by Chief Justice Burger in Dow Chemical,
represents an attempt to address this problem by focusing on the availability
and sophistication of surveillance technology rather than on the way it is used
or the degree to which it invades privacy. Because "general public use" is an
uncertain and moving target,214 and because in any case it is one the Court will
try to hit only after the device in question has been in use for years, it is
unlikely that decisions employing this standard will satisfy or provide useful
guidance for evaluating the next advance in technology.2 1 5 Kyllo's appeal is not
based on the "general public use" analysis, but instead upon its reliance on

213. Writing in 2002 on the interplay between Katz, trespass, and technology,
Professor Tracey Maclin observed: "Even if Katz had not reversed the trespass rule, law
enforcement investigative methods, with the aid of technology, were advancing at such a
rapid pace that the government could obtain various types of information without a physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area." Id. at 88.
214. See Derek T. Conom, Sense-Enhancing Technology and the Search in the Wake of
Kyllo v. United States: Will Prevalence Kill Privacy?, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 749, 773
(2005) (arguing that general public use analysis poses a risk of immersing judges in a morass
of facts concerning price, availability, and level of consumer demand in every case in which
a sense-enhancing device is used); Ohm, supra, note 56, at 1344 (stating that every
technology is a moving target).
215. See Maclin, supra, note 15, at 105 (concluding that whether a device is one in
"general public use" should have no impact on Fourth Amendment analysis).
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widely-held notions of what should remain beyond the prying eyes of law
enforcement.
B. Focusing on First Principles
A more enduring way of thinking about what it means to "search" will
come, not by looking for a common characteristic of "new technology," but by
reconsidering the basic premises on which the Fourth Amendment rests. Not a
new test for devices, but a new, realistic understanding of the privacy
expectations that are shared within our society, will allow the Court to more
faithfully honor the history and language of the Fourth Amendment. Applying
this changing standard will not be easy in some cases, but it will avoid the
artificiality inherent in the Court's use of new rules, new factors, and new
catchphrases for new situations.
What is required in this rapidly developing environment is a new kind of
judicial activism that is rooted in the motivating principles of the Fourth
Amendment. This form of activism does not rely on the creation of ad hoc rules
to address the challenge of each piece of emerging technology. It avoids
constant tinkering with search doctrine and the confusion that is generated by
idiosyncratic decisions left unconnected by a unifying privacy principle. The
judicial activism that is necessary to keep the Fourth Amendment effective is
not the kind of activism that is designed to keep the constitutional language
current. For all of his belief in originalism, Justice Scalia's adoption of a
"general public use" test and his re-creation of the trespass doctrine constituted
a substantial and unexplained departure from the doctrine that existed when he
first assumed the point position for the Court on Fourth Amendment issues.
The kind of judicial activism that will allow the Court to satisfactorily
determine whether as-yet unknown surveillance devices and techniques are
"searches" is the kind of activism that recognizes and respects the underlying
principles of privacy inherent in the Fourth Amendment and the expectations of
the people it protects. It requires the Court to maintain the commitment to
consider what people expect to be private, even if those expectations are not
always empirically supportable. It requires the Court to understand that
investigative motive or intent is not irrelevant, precisely because it is part of the
way people understand what it means to "search." And it requires the Court
always to evaluate the degree to which the government's actions invaded the
privacy of the citizen, and to recognize that an invasion need not be physical,
although it might be.
This view of the Fourth Amendment is a product of "activism" only in the
sense that some of the disparate factors of which it is comprised have been
eschewed in previous decisions or have been used in a more limited fashion.
The activism needed to apply this more expansive approach to privacy includes
a willingness to explicitly and thoroughly explain how each factor influences
the outcome in the particular case before the Court. That outcome is not
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determined by whether the government's latest surveillance device was based
on a satellite, a drone, an airplane, or a device attached to a car bumper. It
should not matter whether the surveillance was carried out by "old"
technology-a dog's nose, a human hand, a flashlight or binoculars, or a fixedwing aircraft-or by "new" technology that is widely available; available but in
limited circulation; available only to military and law enforcement personnel;
or still in the developmental stage and therefore essentially unavailable. Virtual
searches, probing of digital data, accessing data that is stored on a hard drive or
transmitted via microwave or satellite link, all should be analyzed in the same
way because all of these involve the same core concern: Did the government
acquire information in the course of its investigation in a way that violated the
privacy rights of the suspect? That question is answered by resort to the
fundamental values of the Fourth Amendment, and not by the changing nature
of the means used to acquire the information.
CONCLUSION
When law chases technology, it is doomed never to catch up. At no time
in our history has this been more true than it is today. The slow and incremental
changes in investigative techniques developed during the Nineteenth and earlyTwentieth centuries were accommodated with relative ease by the Supreme
Court's limited view of the Fourth Amendment's reach. The explosion of
litigation engendered by the extension of the exclusionary remedy in the early
1960s, however, coincided with the technology revolution ushered in by the
space race, the Cold War, and rapid scientific advances. As law enforcement
agencies increasingly adopted the surveillance and investigative tools that
rapidly became available, the use of those devices was challenged in ways that
pushed the Supreme Court to fashion a wholly different approach to
constitutional privacy protections.
Reasonable expectation of privacy was not an interpretive variation on
the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment. It was
the product of a complete re-thinking of what the Constitution was intended to
protect. As a concept, it has proven itself relatively durable, and it retains at its
core a bundle of values that can continue to guide the Court as it faces an
onslaught of novel legal issues driven by the relentless advance of technology.
The determination of "reasonable expectation" cannot continue, however,
to ignore the ways in which people commonly view what is and isn't private.
Instead, the Fourth Amendment must be seen as an expression of shared values,
no matter how imperfectly courts are able to ascertain those values. Empiricism
and social science can play a useful role in this endeavor, as can the appropriate
use of lay fact-finders. The inquiry must include consideration of the same
factors that are used by people who are not judges or constitutional scholars:
What were the police trying to do? Were they searching for evidence? Were
their techniques excessively invasive or intrusive?
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Viewed in this light, privacy protections do not depend on the kind of
device that is used, but upon the motive of the user and the expectations of
society. The quest for a new bright-line test to address each technological
development is futile, whether it takes the guise of "general public use" or
"physical trespass." Reliance on core principles of the Fourth Amendment,
however, requires no continuous tinkering. The Fourth Amendment need not be
shaped, re-shaped, or shape-shifted with each new application. It need only be
applied to protect the right of "the people" to be secure in our persons, houses,
papers, and effects from government searches that those people would consider
unreasonable.

